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An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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lxii INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION
Let us be frank about it. The intensional abstract 'sex' labels a fiction. By extension or facts, 'sex' varies with every individual not only with age (dates), but in relation to endless other factors, and can be handled adequately only by the use of extensional devices.
4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STRUCTURE OF LANGUAGE
In what is said above we were already dealing with the change from an intensional to an extensional structure of language, and so orientation. We can investigate a step further, and find that the aristotelian structure of language is in the main elementalistic, implying, through structure, a split or separation of what in actuality cannot be separated. For instance, we can verbally split 'body' and 'mind', 'emotion' and 'intellect', 'space' and 'time', etc., which as a matter of fact cannot be separated empirically, and can be split only verbally. These elementalistic, splitting, structural characteristics of language have been firmly rooted in us through the aristotelian training. It built for us a fictitious animistic world not much more advanced than that of the primitives, a world in which under present conditions an optimum adjustment is in principle impossible.
In a non-aristotelian system we do not use elementalistic terminology to represent facts which are non-elementalistic. We use terms like 'semantic reactions', 'psychosomatic', 'space-time', etc., which eliminate the verbally implied splits, and consequent mis-evaluations. In the beginning of my seminars when I am explaining space-time, students often react by saying, 'Oh, you mean "space" and "time"'. This translation would abolish the whole modern advances of physics, because of the structural implications of a delusional verbal split. Similarly the habitual use of the non-elementalistic term 'semantic reactions' eliminates metaphysical and verbal speculations on such elementalistic fictions as 'emotion' and 'intellect', etc., considered as separate entities.
Unfortunately these considerations of structural implications have been entirely disregarded in daily life even by scientists, often befuddling issues very seriously. Thus, the term 'concept' is widely used, and the users are not conscious that this term has elementalistic implications of 'mind' or 'intellect' taken separately, which then become verbal fictions. The actual facts, however, can be simply expressed with correct structural implications. What is called 'concept' amounts to nothing more or less than a verbal formulation, a term which eliminates the false-to-fact implications. Students of general semantics are strongly advised never to use the elementalistic term 'concept', but the non-elementalistic 'formulation' instead. We could eventually berate and ridicule people for their