INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION lxiii
old neuro-linguistic habits, but in our work we take the neurological attitude and realize the difficulties of linguistic habits and neurological re-canalization. From this point of view we only face understandingly the inherent difficulties. I can even now hear the reactions of some of my readers, 'I fully agree with you, and I believe it is a very fine concept'! And so it goes.
From the above it becomes obvious that without changing the language itself, which is practically impossible, we can easily change the structure of language to one free from false-to-fact implications. This change is feasible.
Another example may make issues clearer. Thus the intensional verbal definition of 'man' or 'chair', etc., brings to our consciousness similarities, and, so to say, drives the differences into the 'unconscious'. In a world of processes and non-identity it follows that no individual, 'object', event, etc., can be the 'same' from one moment to the next. And so individualizing (indexes) and temporal devices (dates), etc., should be used conjointly. Thus, obviously chairx1800 is not the 'same' as chairi1940, nor is Smith1Monday the 'same' as Smithtuesday. Orientations in such extensional terms bring to our consciousness not only similarities but also differences. Through training in the consciousness of abstracting we become aware that characteristics are left out in the process of abstracting by our nervous systems, and so we become conscious of the possibility that new factors may arise at any time which would necessitate a change in our generalizations.
Once more we can get a bit of wisdom from mathematical method. I believe it was the great mathematician Sylvester who said that 'in mathematics we look for similarities in differences and differences in similarities', which statement should apply to our whole life orientation. This is made uniquely applicable to life by the new non-aristotelian extensional structure of language and so orientations.
The reader will find in this work the use of certain terms which, although they are standard English words, are not habitually used. The terms used here have been carefully selected and tested, and found to be more similar to the structure of the actual facts. The power of terminology i because of its structural implications, is well known in science, but is entirely disregarded in our daily neuro-linguistic habits.
It is shocking to realize that even such scholarly aristotelians as the Jesuits, and other devotees, are unable or unwilling to comprehend the obvious structural modern neuro-semantic and neuro-linguistic facts. When confronted with them they hide behind a verbal smoke screen of medieval terms such as 'nominalism', 'realism', etc., which in modern sci-