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An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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56                       II. GENERAL ON STRUCTURE
similar to the structure of the experimental facts into a language of different structure, entirely foreign to the world around us and ourselves. Although the popularization of science will probably remain an impossible task, it remains desirable that the results of science should be made accessible to the layman, if means could be found which do not, by necessity, involve misleading accounts. It seems that such methods are at hand and these involve structural and semantic considerations.
The term 'structure' is frequently used in modern scientific literature, but, to the best of my knowledge, only Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein have devoted serious attention to this problem, and much remains to be done. These two authors have analysed or spoken about the structure of propositions, but similar notions can be generalized to languages considered as-a-whole. To be able to consider the structure of one language of a definite structure, we must produce another language of a different structure in which the structure of the first can be analysed. This procedure seems to be new when actually performed, although it has been foreseen by Russell.1 If we produce a ^-system based on 'relations', 'order', 'structure'., we shall be able to discuss profitably the ^-system, which does not allow asymmetrical relations, and so cannot be analysed by A means.
The dictionary meaning of 'structure' is given somewhat as follows: Structure: Manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something (the structure of a house, machine, animal, organ, poem, sentence; sentence of loose structure, its structure is ingenious; ornament should emphasize and not disguise the lines of structure),. The implications of the term 'structure' are clear, even from its daily sense. To have 'structure' we must have a complex of ordered and interrelated parts.
'Structure' is analysed in Principia Mathematica and is also simply explained in Russell's more popular works.2 The Tractatus of Wittgenstein is built on structural considerations, although not much is explained about structure, for the author apparently assumes the reader's acquaintance with the works of Russell.3
One of the fundamental functions of 'mental' processes is to distinguish. We distinguish objects by certain characteristics, which are usually expressed by adjectives. If, by a higher order abstraction, we consider individual objects, not in some perfectly fictitious 'isolation', but as they appear empirically, as members of some aggregate or collection of objects, we find characteristics which belong to the collection