SCIENCE AND SANITY - online book

An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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... to be an abstraction does not mean that an entity is nothing. It merely means that its existence is only one factor of a more concrete element of nature. (573)                                                                A. N. whitehead
In my opinion the answer to this question is briefly, this: - As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. (isi)                        A. einstein
Thus it would seem that, wherever we infer from perceptions, it is only structure that we can validly infer; and structure is what can be expressed by mathematical logic, which includes mathematics. (457)
The current accounts of perception are the stronghold of modern metaphysical difficulties. They nave their origin in the same misunderstanding which led to the incubus of the substance-quality categories. The Greeks looked at a stone, and perceived that it was grey. The Greeks were ignorant of modern physics; but modern philosophers discuss perception in terms of categories derived from the Greeks. (574)               A. N. whitehead
To the biochemist, biophysicist, biologist, and physiological psychologist, however, life and mind are so amazingly complex and comprise so many heterogeneous processes that their blanket designation as two emergent levels cannot seem very illuminating, and to the observer who contemplates the profuse and unabated emergence of idiots, morons, lunatics, criminals, and parasites in our midst, Alexander's prospect of the emergence of deity is about as imminent as the Greek kalends. (SS5)
In speaking of linguistic researches, I do not mean only an analysis of printed 'canned chatter', as Qarence Day would call it, but I mean the behaviour, the performance, s.r of living Smiths and Browns and the connections between the noises uttered by them and their behaviour. No satisfactory analysis has been made, and the reason seems to be in the fact that each existing language really represents a conglomeration of different languages with different structures and is, therefore, extremely complex as long as structure is disregarded. That 'linguists', 'psychologists', 'logicians'., were, and usually are, very innocent of mathematics, a type of language of the greatest simplicity and perfection, with a clear-cut structure, similar to the structure of the world, seems to be responsible for this helplessness. Without a study of mathematics, the adjustment of structure seems impossible.
We should not be surprised to find that mathematics must be considered a language. By definition, whatever has symbols and propositions is called a language, a form of representation for this something-