78 II. GENERAL ON STRUCTURE
appeared to them to be above criticism or assistance by other human beings, and the correct procedure known only to super-men like themselves. So quite naturally they have usually refused to make enquiries. They have refused even to be informed about scientific researches carried on outside the realms of their 'philosophy'. Because of this ignorance, they have, in the main, not even suspected the importance of the problems of structure.
In all fairness, it must be said that not all so-called 'philosophy' represents an episode of semantic illness, and that a few 'philosophers' really do important work. This applies to the so-called 'critical philosophy' and to the theory of knowledge or epistemology. This class of workers I call epistemologists, to avoid the disagreeable implications of the term 'philosopher'. Unfortunately, epistemological researches are most difficult, owing mainly to the lack of scientific psycho-logics, general semantics, and investigations of structure and s.r. We find only a very few men doing this work, which, in the main, is still little known and unapplied. It must be granted that their works do not make easy reading. They do not command headlines; nor are they aided and stimulated by public interest and help.
It must be emphasized again that as long as we remain humans (which means a symbolic class of life), the rulers of symbols will rule us, and that no amount of revolution will ever change this. But what mankind has a right to ask - and the sooner the better - is that our rulers should not be so shamelessly ignorant and, therefore, pathological in their reactions. If a psychiatrical and scientific enquiry were to be made upon our rulers, mankind would be appalled at the disclosures.
We have been speaking about 'symbols', but we have not yet discovered any general theory concerning symbols and symbolism. Usually, we take terms lightly and never 'think' what kind of implication and s.r one single important term may involve. 'Symbol' is one of those important terms, weighty in meanings. If we use the term 'food', for instance, the presupposition is that we take for granted the existence of living beings able to eat; and, similarly, the term 'symbol' implies the existence of intelligent beings. The solution of the problem of symbolism, therefore, presupposes the solution of the problem of 'intelligence' and structure. So, we see that the issues are not only serious and difficult, but, also, that we must investigate a semantic field in which very little has been done.
In the rough, a symbol is defined as a sign which stands for something. Any sign is not necessarily a symbol. If it stands for something, it becomes a symbol for this something. If it does not stand for some-