106 111. NON-ELEMENTAL1STIC STRUCTURES
turally new and far-reaching theories. In testing these theories, new series of experiments were required. Even when the new experiments were devised to verify the older experiments, again the laboratory workers got direct benefit of the structurally new terms. But these benefits were largely unconscious, and so biologists could believe in the older days that they had no laboratory benefits from the use of such terms; however, this belief is now entirely unjustified.
Since the non-el principle is not only a structurally justified empirical generalization, but also involves for its application the structural rebuilding of our language and old theories, the semantic issues are far-reaching and of great practical value.
The application of the principle means the rejection of the old elementalism which results and leads to identifications and to blinding semantic disturbances, which, in turn, prevent clear vision and unbiased creative freedom.
According to the modern theory of materials, as given in Part X, the mutual interdependence, the mutual action and reaction of everything in this world upon everything else appears as a structural fact and a necessity, and so el languages cannot be expected to lead to satisfactory semantic solutions. We should not be surprised to find that the struggle against identification and elementalism appears at some stage in every science.
Some of the most prominent examples of this tendency outside of biology, psychiatry., can be found in modern physics. From a structural point of view the whole theory of Einstein is nothing else than an attempt to reformulate physics on a structurally new non-el and A foundation - an exact structural parallel of the biological organism-as-a-whole principle.
Einstein realized that the empirical structure of 'space' and 'time' with which the physicist and the average man deals is such that it cannot be empirically divided, and that we actually deal with a blend which we have split only elementalistically and verbally into these fictitious entities. He decided to build a verbal system closer in structure to the facts of experience and, with the help of the mathematician Minkowski, he formulated a system of new structure which employed a non-el language of space-time. As we know from physics and astronomy, this non-el language suggested experiments, and so it had beneficial laboratory application. But, in fact, the influence goes still deeper, as the present work will show, for such structural advances carry with them profound psycho-logical, semantic effects. Although, at present, these