108 III. NON-ELEMENTALISTIC STRUCTURES
be considered as a manifestation of 'energy'. If we choose to carry this analysis further, we should find that 'energy' is also not a very satisfactory term, but that 'action', perhaps, is more fundamental.
In dealing with ourselves and the world around us, we must take into account the structural fact that everything in this world is strictly interrelated with everything else, and so we must make efforts to discard primitive el terms, which imply structurally a non-existing isolation.
The moment this is realized, we shall have to treat the non-el principle seriously. As the new terms have, also, their non-el implications, such terms throw new light on old problems.
In practice, it is difficult, at first, to avoid the use of old terms. When we want to digest fully a new and important work based on new structural terms and acquire corresponding s.r, the best way to train oneself in the use of the new terms is by gradually dropping the old terms. If we have to use the old terms, then we should train ourselves to be aware of their insufficiency and of their fallacious structural implications, and so be free from the old s.r.
The use of the new terms should be deliberate. We should put the problem to ourselves somewhat as follows: The old language is structurally, and, therefore, by implication, semantically unsatisfactory; the new terms seem to correspond closer to facts; let us test the new terms. Are the new terms always structurally satisfactory? Probably not, but in science experiments check predictions, and so new structural issues become clarified.
We have been speaking about new and old terms quite simply, yet the issues are not so simple. The invention of a single structurally new term always involves new structural and relational notions, which, again, involve s.r. For instance, if we study any event, and in that study use the terms 'tropism', or 'dynamic gradient', or 'time-binding', or 'order of abstractions', or 'space-time', or 'wave-packets'., we must use all structural and semantic implications the terms involve.
Using the first four terms, we are bound to treat the organism-as-a-whole, for the terms are not el. They are not based on the notion of, nor do they postulate, some fictitious 'isolated' elements. In using space-time, we introduce the individuality of events, as every 'point of space' carries with itself a date, which, by necessity, makes every 'point' in space-time unique and individual. In using the term 'wave-packet', we re-interpret the older objectified and, perhaps, fictitious 'electron',.
The consistent and permanent use of such terms naturally involves, structurally, a new world-outlook, new s.r, more justified by our scientific and daily experience. But the greatest gain is usually in getting