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An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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ON ORDER
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more general or structurally more satisfactory undefined terms, or can reduce the number of such terms. Which set we accept is determined, in the main, by pragmatic, practical, and structural reasons. Out of two systems which have many characteristics of usefulness., in common, we would and should select the one which assumes least, is the simplest, and carries the furthest. Such changes from one set to another, when scientific, are usually epoch-making, as exemplified in mathematics.
It is important to realize that this semantic attitude signalizes a new epoch in the development of science. In scientific literature of the old days, we had a habit of demanding, 'define your terms'. The new 1933 standards of science really should be, 'state your undefined terms'. In other words, 'lay on the table your metaphysics, your assumed structure, and then only proceed to define your terms in terms of these undefined terms'. This has been done completely, or approximately so, only in mathematics. Yet, probably no one will deny that the new requirements of science (1933), no matter how laborious, are really desirable, and constitute an advance in method, in accordance with the structure of human knowledge.
In the present work, this method will be employed practically all through. Of course, names for objects may be accepted without enquiry. So we have already a large vocabulary at our disposal. But names alone do not give propositions. We need relatipn-words, and it is here where our undefined terms become important. Up to this stage of the present work, I have accepted, without over-full explanation, the vocabularies made by the linguists of exact science, whom we usually call mathematicians. There is an enormous benefit in doing so, because, no matter how imperfect the mathematical vocabulary may be, it is an extensive and developed linguistic system of similar structure to the world around us and to our nervous system 1933. (See Part V.)
Some of the most important undefined terms which play a marked role in this work are 'order' (in the sense explained), 'relation', and 'difference', although we could define relation in terms of multidimensional order. There is a remarkable structural characteristic of these terms; namely, that they are non-el, and that they apply to 'senses' as well as to 'mind'. It is, perhaps, well to suggest that, in future works, the terms selected should be of the non-el type. Since these terms apply equally to 'senses' and to 'mind', we see that in such terms we may attempt to give a 'coherent' account of what we experience. The expression 'coherent' implies 'mind', and 'experience' implies 'senses'. It is amusing to watch this peculiar circularity of human knowledge, many instances of which will appear later on. Thus, there was great difficulty