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An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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ON THE NOTION OF INFINITY
211
are always equal. Suppose that one in each twenty inhabitants of this town has M as the first letter of his name. What is the probability that, 'by chance', all the names of the audience would begin with M ? Let us call such a happening the M-event. In the simplest case, when the daily. number of listeners is only one, the probability of an M-event is 1 in 20, or 1/20. The probability of an M-event for an audience of 2 is 1 in 20 X 20 = 400, or 1/400. The probability that an audience of three members should have all three names begin with M would decrease twenty times further. Only once in 8000 lectures, on an average, would an M-event happen. For five people it would amount to 1 in 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 X 20 = 3,200,000 days, or 1/3,200,000, or once in approximately 9000 years; for ten people, about once in thirty billion years; for twenty people, about once in a third of a quadrillion years. For one hundred people, the recurrence period of the M-event would be given as once in a number of years represented by more than a hundred figures. If the town, in this last example, should be as old as the solar system, and if the lectures had been delivered daily to an audience of one hundred people through this inconceivably long period, the probability is extremely small that the M-event would happen at all.2
From the human, anthropomorphic, point of view, we would say that such an event is impossible. But it must be remembered that this is only an anthropomorphic point of view, and our judgements are coloured by the temporal scale of our own lives. Of course, to carry such an anthropomorphic viewpoint into cosmic speculations is simply silly, a survival of the primitive structure of language and its progeny - metaphysics and mythologies.
The theory of infinity throws considerable structural light on such primitive speculations. In this external world, we deal with processes, and, as we measure 'length' by comparison with freely selected convenient units of 'length', let us say, an inch; or we measure 'volume' by freely selected convenient units of 'volume'; so, also, we compare processes with some freely selected and convenient unit-process. The diurnal rotation of our earth is such a process, and, if we choose, we can use it as a measuring unit or as a comparison standard. Of late, we have become aware that the rotation of the earth is not quite regular, and so, for accurate measurements, the old accepted unit-process of a day, or its subdivision, a second, is not entirely satisfactory. For scientific purposes, we are trying to find some better unit-process, but we have difficulty, as the problem is naturally circular. When we speak in terms of a 'number of years', or of seconds, we speak about perfectly good observational experimental facts, about quite definite relations, the best we know in