'MATTER', 'SPACE', 'TIME' 241
to static, and vice versa; why we have quantum theories and conditions; and why we have problems of continuity versus discontinuity, atomic theories,.
The above is not a plea for certain old-fashioned 'idealistic philosophies' and still less for 'solipsism'. Far from it. The object of this present work is to face hard structural experimental m.o facts, analyse these facts in a language of a similar structure (A), and so to reach tentatively new conclusions which again can be verified by experiments. Once more the reader must be warned against carelessly translating the structurally new terms into the old terms. The complete structural, psycho-logical, semantic, and neurological analysis of one single such new term would afford material for several volumes and so is impossible in this work. The usefulness of the old terms has been exhausted. The structural consequences of the old terms have been practically all worked out, and, as a rule, we cannot have much quarrel with the older conclusions in the old language. If we reach different conclusions, or get sonie new emphasis, it will be due to the use of the structurally new language. If we translate the new into the old, the old conclusions are usually truer than the new ones. The reverse is also true; the old conclusions become false or, at best, only gain emphasis because of the structure of the new language. The problem of all theories, old or new, is to give a structural account of the facts known, to account for exceptions, and to predict new experimental structural facts which again may be verified empirically.
Section D. Semantic considerations.
We speak much and vaguely about the 'structure' of language, but extremely little work has been done in this field. In the present work, we not only tackle this problem as best we can, theoretically, but we also use a language of a new non-el, functional structure, and the results, whatever their value, are actually the results of such procedure.
A short while ago we did not even know that such problems existed. Dreams, alone, about such problems did not help, for, before the structures of two different entities can be compared, these entities must first be produced. Then, and only then, can we compare and evaluate them. Before we could compare the A, the E, and the N systems with A, E, and R systems the last had to be produced, no matter how imperfect they might be at the beginning.
Something similar can be said about languages. Before we can speak of them in the plural and compare them, we must have more than one for comparison. Mathematics has pointed out this problem for us in