248 V. MATHEMATICS A A LANGUAGE
Investigating structure, we have found that structure can be denned in terms of relations; and the latter, for special purposes, in terms of multi-dimensional order. Obviously, to investigate structure, we must look for relations, and so for multi-dimensional order. The full application of the above principles becomes our guide for future enquiry.
In the recent past, we have become accustomed to such arguments as, for instance, that the theory of Einstein has to be accepted on 'epistemological' grounds. Naturally, the scientist or the layman who has heard the last term, but never bothered to ascertain that it means 'according to the structure of human knowledge', would recognize no necessity to accept something which violates all his habitual s.r, for reasons about which he does not know or care. But if we say that the Einstein theory has to be accepted, for the 'time' being, at least, as an irreversible structural linguistic progress, this statement carries for many quite a different verbal and semantic implication, and one worth considering.
Mathematics has, of late, become so extremely elaborate and complex that it takes practically a lifetime to specialize in even one of its many fields. Here and there notions of extreme creative generality appear, which help us to see relations and dependence between formerly non-connected fields. For instance, the arithmetization of mathematics, or the theory of groups, or the theory of aggregates, has each become such a supreme generalization. At present, there is a general tendency among all of us, scientists included, to confuse orders of abstractions. This results in a psycho-logical semantic blockage and in the impossibility of seeing broader issues clearly.
Some of the structural issues are still but little understood, and, in writing this chapter, I lay myself open to a reproach from the layman that I have given too much attention to mathematics, and from the professional mathematician that I have given too little. My reply is that what is said here is necessary for rounding up the semantic foundations of the system, and that I explain only enough to carry the main points of structure and as semantic suggestions for further semantic researches.
I have found that among some physicists and some mathematicians the thesis that mathematics is the only language which, in 1933, is similar in structure to the world, is not always acceptable. As to the second thesis, the similarity of its structure to our nervous system, some even seem to feel that this statement borders on the sacrilegious! These objectors, apparently, believe that I ascribe more to mathematics than is just. Some physicists point out to me the non-satisfactory development of mathematics, and they seem to confuse the inadequacy of a given mathematical theory with the general m.o structure of mathematics. Thus, if some physical experimental investigation is conducted - for