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An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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MATHEMATICS AND THE WORLD                 253
A semantic definition of mathematics may run somehow as follows: Mathematics consists of limited linguistic schemes of multiordinal relations capable of exact treatment at a given date.
After I have given a semantic definition of number, it will be obvious that the above definition covers all existing disciplines considered mathematical. However, these developments are not fixed affairs. Does that definition provide for their future growth? By inserting as a fundamental part of the definition 'exact treatment at a given date', it obviously does. Whenever we discover any relations in any fields which will allow exact 'logical' treatment, such a discipline will be included in the body of linguistic schemes called mathematics, and, at present, there are no indications that these developments can ever come to an end. When 'logic' becomes an oo-valued 'structural calculus', then mathematics and 'logic' will merge completely and become a general science of m.o relations and multi-dimensional order, and all sciences may become exact.
It is necessary to show that this definition is not too broad, and that it eliminates notions which are admittedly non-mathematical, without invalidating the statement that the content of all knowledge is structural, and so ultimately relational. The word 'exact' eliminates non-mathematical relations. If we enquire into the meaning of the word 'exact', we find from experience that this meaning is not constant, but that it varies with the date, and so only a statement 'exact at a given date' can have a definite meaning.
We can analyse a simple statement, 'grass is green' (the 'is' here is the 'is' of predication, not of identity), which, perhaps, represents an extreme example of a non-mathematical statement; but a similar reasoning can be applied to other examples. Sometimes we have a feeling which we express by saying, 'grass is green'. Usually, such a feeling is called a 'perception'. But is such a process to be dismissed so simply, by just calling it a name, 'perception' ? It is easy to 'call names under provocation', as Santayana says somewhere; but does that exhaust the question ?
If we analyse such a statement further, we find that it involves comparison, evaluation in certain respects with other characters of experience., and the statement thus assumes relational characteristics. These, in the meantime, are non-exact and, therefore, non-mathematical. If we carry this analysis still further, involving data taken from chemistry, physics, physiology, neurology., we involve relations which become more and more exact, and, finally, in such terms as 'wave-length', 'frequency'. , we reach structural terms which allow of exact 1933 treatment. It is true that a language of 'quality' conceals relations, sometimes very effectively; but once 'quality' is taken as the reaction of a given organism