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An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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262                V. MATHEMATICS A A LANGUAGE
As relations, generally, are empirically present, and as man and his 'knowledge' is as 'natural' as rocks, flowers, and donkeys, we should not be surprised to find that the unique language of exact., relations called mathematics is, by necessity, the natural language of man and similar in structure to the world and our nervous system.
As has already been stated, it is incorrect to argue from the structure of mathematical theories to the structure of the world, and so try to establish the similarity of structure; but that such enquiry must be independent and start with quite ordinary structural experiences, and only at a later stage proceed to more advanced knowledge as given by science. Because this analysis must be independent, it can also be made very simple and elementary. All exact sciences give us a wealth of experimental data to establish the first thesis on similarity of structure; and it is unnecessary to repeat it here. I will restrict myself only to a minimum of quite obvious facts, reserving the second thesisabout the similarity of structure with our nervous systemfor the next chapter.
If we analyse the silent objective level by objective means available in 1933, say a microscope, we shall find that whatever we can see, handle., represents an absolute individual, and different front anything else in this world. We discover, thus, an important structural fact of the external world; namely, that in it, everything we can see, touch., that is to say, all lower order abstractions represent absolute individuals, different from everything else.
On the verbal level, under such empirical conditions, we should then have a language of similar structure; namely, one giving us an indefinite number of proper names, each different. We find such a language uniquely in numbers, each number 1, 2, 3., being a unique, sharply distinguishable, proper name for a relation, and, if we wish, for anything else also.
Without some higher abstractions we cannot be human at all. No science could exist with absolute individuals and no relations; so we pass to higher abstractions and build a language of say where the x shows, let us say, that we deal with a variable x with many values, and the number we assign to i indicates the individuality under consideration. From the structural point of view, such a vocabulary is similar to the world around us; it accounts for the individuality of the external objects, it also is similar to the structure of our nervous system, because it allows generalizations or higher order abstractions, emphasizes the abstracting nervous characteristics,. The subscript emphasizes the differences; the letter x implies the similarities.