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An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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318
VI. ON PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY
that is to say, search for structure in the empirical world, and, once this has been found, adjust, accordingly, the structure of our language.
The structure of the daily, as well as of the 'philosophical', language, which we inherited, in the main, from our primitive ancestors, is such that we have separate terms for factors which are not separable, such as 'matter', 'space', 'time', or 'body', 'soul', 'mind',. Then, as it were, we try to make out of the word, flesh, by reversing the natural order and affectively ascribing a delusional objectivity to these terms.
If we deal with the silent, un-speakable, objective level and try to divide according to the implications of the verbal division, we find a brutal fact, which, until Einstein and Minkowski, has escaped scientific verbal formulation, that this cannot be done at all. On the objective level every dealing with 'matter' involves 'space' and 'time'; any dealing with 'space' involves some fulness of something and 'time'; and every dealing with 'time' involves 'something' and 'space'.
The structure of the world happens to be such that empirically 'matter', 'space', 'time', cannot be divided; wherefore, we should have a non-el language of similar structure.- This was accomplished by Einstein-* see page xii Minkowksi, when they created a language of 'space-time', in which the hard lumps against which we bump our noses are connected analytically with the curvature of space-time.
In this new, non-el, four-dimensional language, every three-dimensional point of 'space' has a date, and so is different. For our purpose, we do not need, at present, to bother much about its curvature or the kinks in space-time, called in the old way 'matter', but we must emphasize that the fourfold order is of great importance, as it corresponds structurally to experience, and is intimately connected with physiological reactions, the semantic included.
There is a great deal of confusion about these problems among laymen and also among scientists. From a structural point of view, the issues are quite simple, and there is nothing sensational in the latest announcement of Einstein that 'space' in its importance is displacing 'matter' (Nottingham Lectures). Naturally, the statement in this form is rather baffling and attracted much - even newspaper - attention. Yet it seems that even the einsteinists do not fully realize the verbal, structural, and semantic issues involved.
For the layman, as well as for the majority of the physicists in their less sober, or metaphysical, moments, 'space' is 'emotionally' newtonian and an 'absolute void', which, of course, being 'absolute nothingness', cannot have objective existence, by definition. For Einstein, 'space-time' is, semantically, 'fulness', not 'emptiness', and, in his language, he does