ON CONDITIONAL REFLEXES 327
person, and vice versa. The lack of consciousness of abstracting introduces, by structural necessity, an identification of orders of abstractions; namely, the confusion of descriptions with inferences, and vice versa. This makes it imperative to avoid psycho-logical language as much as possible. It is also bad epistemology to use a language which applies to a few individuals (psycho-logics) for describing functions which are much more general, and which, fundamentally, apply to all organisms.
It is a striking fact that, although physiology is a fairly old and well-developed discipline, yet the purely physiological approach to the study of the brain-functions is very recent, and, in the main, has been carried on by Pavlov and his followers. Pavlov gives us a simple yet profoundly true explanation; namely, that the higher nervous centres have never been treated on equal footing with other organs, or other parts of the nervous system. The activities of the hemispheres have been treated from a 'psychological' point of view, and, by analogy, we have ascribed to animals similar 'psychological' states, a remnant of primitive animism. As such attitudes have become more and more obviously absurd, we have drifted into the opposite absurdity of animalism, ascribing animal characteristics to man, forgetting that the human nervous system is far more complex, matures later than in any animal, and is a non-additive affair. Naturally, reasoning by such analogies must be fallacious.
The prevalent complete disregard of the fact that these issues are linguistic and structural makes the advances in these fields very slow and halting, and only so-called 'geniuses' are capable of breaking through these semantic barriers. Once the linguistic character of the issues is fully realized, the psycho-logical, semantic blockage is removed, freedom of analysis is inwardly established, and even 'non-geniuses' will produce important creative work. Indeed, we may find that with this realization, particularly if embodied in early education, the 'normal' man would be, what we call at present, a 'genius'.
This conclusion naturally follows if we abandon animalistic analogies and face the fact that high-grade human intelligence happens to be not less 'natural' and inherent in the history of evolution than any other 'tropism'. By eliminating the psycho-logical semantic blockage due to copying animals in our nervous reactions, we may handle this important human function of language properly. Man will function as man, in accordance with the structure of his more complex nervous system. There is no doubt at present that some organisms called 'man' have an important function connected with s.r called 'speech', perhaps the most complex and involved and also unique function evolved by this class of life, and which it does not yet know how to use. Biologically and physio-