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An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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dated as such by a single failure, if the possibility of it is not foreseen by the structural flexibility of the general method.
From what I gather (though I may be mistaken) of every hundred patients who seek relief in psychotherapy, fifty fail completely. The remaining fifty can, perhaps, be divided into two groups; the first one of, say, ten, who become entirely relieved; the other remaining forty, who improve in different degrees. The analysis in the present work may, perhaps, explain why the percentage of failures is so high. It seems that no school of psychotherapists has analysed 'mental' ills from the general non-el structural and semantic point of view; and, although the physicians struggle in every case to abolish the relative unconditionally of the reactions, their methods are neither neurological, nor physiological, nor fundamental enough.
The language used in these scientific theories includes such terms as 'conscious', 'unconscious', 'repression', 'inhibition', 'transfer', 'complex'', . There seems no doubt that some such terms cover a few of the facts we know from experience and observation, and that they may be structurally correct on the psycho-logical level. The nervous mechanism involved, although discovered twenty-five years ago, has not generally attracted the attention of physicians, and the postulated theories, lacking neurological foundations, are often called 'far-fetched speculations', a fact which is ultimately harmful to the whole psychotherapeutic and semantic hygiene movement.
The 'psychologists' and the psychiatrists are very much divided as to the role 'introspection' plays. This is due to the confusion of the orders of abstractions. Animals may 'feel', may 'suffer', but they cannot describe. Humans differ in this respect; the given person may feel pain, the pain is very objective to the given individual, and it is not words (objective level) ; but we can describe it, this description being valid on the descriptive level, a higher order abstraction than the objective level (which is un-speakable for the given individual). If we ascribe this process to others, this is no longer a description but an inference, or a still higher order abstraction, which statements have to be verified by averaging. Scientifically (1933), psycho-logics are impossible without the description of internal processes, and, therefore, some 'introspection', so that the United States Behaviourism becomes a very naive discipline. The Behaviourists mean well, methodologically, without realizing fully what scientific methodology is. They completely condemn 'introspection', yet they continually use it. Consciousness of abstracting solves the riddles of pro- or anti-behaviouristic attitudes, because, when we are fully