384 VII. THE MECHANISM OF TIME-BINDING
should be referred to by structurally new terms. In fact, we know that the old term 'matter' can be displaced by some other term connected with the 'curvature' of 'space-time'.
There is on record a striking example of what the structure of a form of representation means. In a paper printed in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, February, 1926, Professor G. Y. Rainich, the mathematician, tried to introduce 'mass' into space-time, the terms belonging to forms of representation of different structure. He succeeded, but at the price of splitting space-time into the original space and time. This is, as far as my knowledge goes, the first proof of how intimately a form of representation is inwardly and structurally interconnected. This fact is of extraordinary semantic importance for psycho-logicians and psychiatrists, who always study symbolism of some sort. It would be of great interest to have such problems worked out by them.
As abstracting in many orders seems to be a general process found in all forms of life, but particularly in humans, it is of importance to be clear on this subject and to select a language of proper structure. As we know already, we use one term, say 'apple', for at least four entirely different entities; namely, (1) the event, or scientific object, or the sub-microscopic physico-chemical processes, (2) the ordinary object manufactured from the event by our lower nervous centres, (3) the psychological picture probably manufactured by the higher centres, and (4) the verbal definition of the term. If we use a language of adjectives and subject-predicate forms pertaining to 'sense' impressions, we are using a language which deals with entities inside our skin and characteristics entirely non-existent in the outside world. Thus the events outside our skin are neither cold nor warm, green nor red, sweet nor bitter., but these characteristics are manufactured by our nervous system inside our skins, as responses only to different energy manifestations, physico-chemical processes,. When we use such terms, we are dealing with characteristics which are absent in the external world, and build up an anthropomorphic and delusional world non-similar in structure to the world around us. Not so if we use a language of order, relations, or structure, which can be applied to sub-microscopic events, to objective levels, to semantic levels, and which can also be expressed in words. In using such language, we deal with characteristics found or discovered on all levels which give us structural data uniquely important for knowledge. The ordering on semantic levels in the meantime abolishes identification. It is of extreme importance to realize that the relational., attitude is optional and can be applied everywhere and always, once the above-