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An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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inferences, which I call confusion of higher order abstractions. In the latter case, we should notice that inferences involve usually more intense semantic components, such as 'opinions', 'beliefs', 'wishes'., than descriptions. These inferences may have a definite, objective, un-speakable character and may represent, then, a semantic state which is not words, and so objectifications of higher order may be produced.
When we introduce the ordinal language, we should notice that under known conditions we deal with an ordered natural series; namely, events first, object next; object first, label next; description first, inferences next,. This order expresses the natural importance, giving us the natural base for evaluation and so for our natural human s.r. If we identify two different orders, by necessity, we evaluate them equally, which always involves errors, resulting potentially in semantic shocks. As we deal in life with an established natural order of values which can be expressed, for my purpose, by a series decreasing in value: events or scientific objects, ordinary objects, labels, descriptions, inferences.; identification results in a very curious semantic situation.
would be ascribing twice, or three times, or fifty times, or a hundred times., more delusional values to the right-hand side and under-evaluate the left-hand side, than the natural order of evaluation would require. Nature exhibits, in my language and in this field, an asymmetrical relation of 'more', or 'less' inaccessible to A procedure. Under the influence of aristotelianism, when, through identification, we ascribe to nature