418 Vll. THE MECHANISM OE TIME-BINDING
descriptions. This may be made clearer by examples. In studying these examples, it should be remembered that the organism acts as-a-whole, and that 'emotional' factors are, therefore, always present and should not be disregarded. In this study, the reader should try to put himself 'emotionally' in the place of the Smith we speak about; then he cannot fail to understand the serious semantic disturbances these identifications create in everybody's life.
Let us begin with a Smith who knows nothing of what has been said here, and who is not conscious of abstracting. For him, as well as for Fido, there is, in principle, no realization of the 'characteristics left out'. He is 'emotionally' convinced that his words entirely cover the 'object' which 'is so and so'. He identifies his lower abstractions with characteristics left out, with higher abstractions which have all characteristics included. He ascribes to words an entirely false value and certitude which they cannot have. He does not realize that his words may have different meanings for the other fellow. He ascribes to words 'emotional' objectivity and value, and the verbal, A 'permanence', 'definiteness', 'one-value'., to objects. When he hears something that he does not like, he does not ask 'what do you mean?', but, under the semantic pressure of identification, he ascribes his own meanings to the other fellow's words. For him, words 'are' 'emotionally' overloaded, objectified semantic fetishes, even as to the primitive man who believed in the 'magic of words'. Upon hearing anything strange, his s.r is undelayed and may appear as, 'I disagree with you', or 'I don't believe you',. There is no reason to be dramatic about any unwelcome statement. One needs definitions and interpretations of such statements, which probably are correct from the speaker's point of view, if we grant him his informations, his undefined terms, the structure of his language and premises which build up his s.r. But our Smith, innocent of the 'structure of human knowledge', has mostly a semantic belief in the one-value, absoluteness., of things, and thinghood of words, and does not know, or does not remember, that words are not the events themselves. Words represent higher order abstractions manufactured by higher nerve centres, and objects represent lower order abstractions manufactured by lower nerve centres. Under such identity-delusions, he becomes an absolutist, a dogmatist, a finalist,. He seeks to establish 'ultimate truths', 'eternal verities'., and is willing to fight for them, never knowing or remembering, otherwise forgetting, the 'characteristics left out'; never recognizing that the noises he makes are not the objective actualities we deal with. If somebody contradicts him, he is much disturbed. Forgetting characteristics left out, he is always 'right'. For him his statement is not