444 VII. THE MECHANISM OF TIME-BINDING
of it can be found by analysis practically everywhere. Our problem is to analyse the general case. Let us follow up roughly the process.
We assume, for instance, an hypothetical case of an ideal observer who observes correctly and gives an impersonal, unbiased account of
I use various fanciful symbols, and not words. The observer then gives a description of the above happenings, let us say o, b, c, d, . . . , x; then he makes an inference from these descriptions and reaches a conclusion or forms a judgement A about these facts. We assume that facts unknown to him, which always exist, are not important in this case. Let us assume, also, that his conclusion seems correct and that the action which this conclusion motivates is appropriate. Obviously, we deal with at least three different levels of abstractions: the seen, experienced., lower order abstractions (un-speakable) ; then the descriptive level, and, finally, the inferential levels.
Let us assume now another individual, Smithi, ignorant of structure or the orders of abstractions, of consciousness of abstracting, of s.r.; a politician or a preacher, let us say, a person who habitually identifies, confuses his orders, uses inferential language for descriptions, and
The happenings appeared the 'same', yet the unconscious identification of levels brought finally an entirely different conclusion to motivate a quite different action, C".
A diagram will make this structurally clearer, as it is very difficult to explain this by words alone. On the Structural Differential it is shown without difficulty.