SCIENCE AND SANITY - online book

An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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not yet fully known, but the principles are firmly established. With a A understanding and evaluation of the unique importance of structure as the only possible content of 'knowledge', these 'firmly established' principles become 'irreversibly established''. We may go further and say that the quantum mechanics point of view becomes the first structurally correct point of view and, as such, should be accepted fully in any sane orientation. If we stop identification, then we will differentiate between some simple facts. For instance, we will understand that any semantic state, reaction, or process has its corresponding sub-microscopic, structural, colloidal, and ultimately quantum mechanical processes going on in the nervous system; however, the s.r, or feelings of pain or pleasure., are not the sub-microscopic processes. These belong to different levels, but with oo-valued semantics we can establish in principle a one-to-one correspondence between them. Thus, when we differentiate adequately, the older wac/tinistic objections disappear entirely; and, in its proper field, for structural reasons, we must preserve the mechanistic, and entirely abandon the too crude mechannistic attitudes. The mechanistic (1933) attitude is based on structure and so is indispensable for visualization ; and training in visualisation automatically abolishes objectifica-tion, which represents an important special case of all identification. From the point of view of a-system, adjustment and sanity in humans depend, to a large extent, on their 'understanding', which is entirely structural in character; therefore, we must accept a mechanistic (1933) attitude, which, in the meantime, can be visualized.
The finding of structural means of representation facilitates visualization, imagining, picturing,. In the adjustment trend we start with lower nerve-impressions, 'senses', 'feelings'., lower abstractions, and these are abstracted again by the higher centres. The higher centres produce the 'very abstract' theories, which cannot be visualized for a while. The lower centres, which are involved in visualization, can deal only with structures which can be 'concretely pictured'. So we always try to invent mechanistic or geometrical theories, such as can be handled by the lower centres.
Individual 'experiences', supplied by the lower centres of different individuals, do not blend directly. They are blended in the higher centres. In them manifold experiences, whether individual or accumulated by the race (time-binding), are abstracted further, integrated, and summarized. Once this has been accomplished, structural means are sought and discovered to translate these higher abstractions into lower, the only ones with which the lower centres can deal. Then we can 'visualize' our theories, and the higher centres not only influence the lower centres, but