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An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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the lower centres have appropriate means by which to co-operate with the higher centres in their new non-el quests.
The lack of explicitly structural forms of representations is responsible, also, for the difficulties which arise when the higher order abstractions are translated into the reflex-reactions of the lower centres, which can deal with 'intuitions', 'orientations', 'visualization',. The so-called 'geniuses' have a very subtle nervous system in which the translation of higher order abstractions into lower and vice versa is easily accomplished. From the point of view of forms or representations, we can have two issues: (1) we may have el forms of representations which are not based on structure, visualization., and cannot efficiently affect the activities of the lower centres; (2) we may have a non-el system based on structure, visualization., which can be translated simply, easily, and efficiently into the terms of the lower centres. These problems are of educational importance and should be worked out more fully.
In my experience with grown-ups who have had only a short contact with my work, I find, in many cases, that, although they may have even given their complete verbal appVoval of the main point of the system, yet, invariably, in practice, the full application is lacking. Obviously, the semantic importance of the present findings is not in the verbal approval alone, when that approval is not applied, but in the consistent and permanent instinctive acquisition of the new semantic attitude which involves a complete elimination of identification, allness, elementalism,.
We can teach any one to repeat verbally, by heart, instructions for operating an automobile, a piano, or a typewriter; but no one could operate them satisfactorily by reflex-action after such verbal training alone. To operate effectively and skilfully any structural complex, we must become intimately familiar with its structural working through actual reflex-training, and only then can we expect the best results. In my experience, this is true with language, and, without the visual Structural Differential on which we can point our finger to the objective level and urge silence., such basic semantic reflex-training cannot properly be given.
If we ask a man: 'Do you know how to drive a car?', and he answers 'Yes', we assume that he has acquired the proper reflexes. If he answers 'No, but I know about it', he means that he has not acquired the proper reflexes, but that his 'knowledge' is on purely verbal levels, non-effective in application on non-verbal reflex-levels. This applies fully to s.r; we may 'know' about them, but we may never apply successfully what we supposedly 'know'. To 'know' represents a multiordinal process which involves equally the activities of the lower nerve centres and of the higher. In our el systems we had no such distinction, and so we