SCIENCE AND SANITY - online book

An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

Home | About | Philosphy | Contact | Search




456         VII. THE MECHANISM OF TIME-BINDING
confused them. The older 'knowledge', when presented in el language, could not have been absorbed easily by the non-el organisms-as-a-whole. As the main task, at present, is to unlearn the older s.r, the new reactions need a persistent training, particularly by the grown-ups. The non-el, A language and method prove to have psychophysiological importance.
Although the neurological mechanism underlying identification, ob-jectification, visualization., is not well known (1933), neurology gives us evidence that in these states, as well as in delusions and hallucinations, the actual lower nerve centres are somehow engaged. We may assume that different 'resistances', 'blockages'., in some parts of the nervous system make the passage of nervous impulses more difficult, and it seems reasonable to suppose that, in such cases, the paths travelled by the nervous currents are different.
In Fig. 1, an hypothetical and over-simplified scheme of the different types of distribution of nervous currents, as is known functionally, is suggested. The ordering is not anatomical but functional in terms of degrees of intensity. In this scheme, we may consider that the nervous impulse (A) reaches the lower nerve centres, the brain-stem and the thalamus, passes through the sub-cortical layers and the cortex, continuously being transformed. Finally, in returning, it may take either the beneficial and adaptive semantic form of visualization (V), free from identification and semantic disturbances, or may involve identification, with semantic disturbances, such as objectifications of different orders (O), delusions (D), illusions (I), or, finally hallucinations (H).
Identification, or confusion of orders of abstractions, consists of erroneous evaluation: that which is going on inside of our skin has objective existence outside of our skins; the ascribing of external objectivity to words; the identification in value of 'memories of experiences' with experience; the identification of our s.r and states with words; the identification of inferences with descriptions,. Identification is greatly facilitated, if not
un-speakable semantic level, and for the verbal definition. Under such linguistic conditions, it is practically impossible, without special training,