IDENTIFICATION AND VISUALIZATION 457
not to identify the four entirely different abstractions into one., with all (lie following sinister consequences.
Delusions represent incorrect notions and inappropriate s.r formed, not by insufficient knowledge or 'logic', but by affective pressure in a definite evaluational direction; as, for instance, delusions of grandeur; delusions of persecution; delusions of 'sin'; delusions of reference,.
Illusions appear more like real perceptions, but pathologically changed. For instance, anything may be semantically'coloured or interpreted, or evaluated as an offense, or a threat, or a promise,.
Hallucinations consist of 'perceptions', with all their vividness, but without any external stimuli. Patients hear voices; see visions; feel pricks or burnings., when there is nothing to hear, or see, or to be pricked by.
In visualization, identification does not occur; orders of abstractions are not confused; semantic disturbances do not appear; the evaluation i.v correct; a 'picture' is evaluated as a picture and not as the events,. In other words, because of the consciousness of abstracting, the natural order of evaluation is preserved. But once, through identification, this natural order is reversed, it marks a pathological condition more or less morbid, and often of a non-adaptive character.
Identification represents, in affective tension, the mildest semantic disturbance, consisting of an error in meanings and evaluation. Objects me evaluated as events; 'ideas', or higher order abstractions, are evaluated as objects; as experience; as the un-speakable semantic states or reactions; otherwise, as lower order abstractions. The confusion in the lie Id of higher order abstractions follows a similar rule. Inferences obviously represent higher order abstractions than descriptions; so, when I hey are not differentiated, higher order abstractions are again identified with the lower. We all know from daily-life experience the fantastic amount of suffering we can, and do, actually produce for ourselves and others with such identifications.
In delusions, a similar but more intense identification occurs, resulting in erroneous semantic evaluation; wishes, feelings, and other semantic states inside of our skins are projected into the external world, giving delusionally strong objective evaluation.
In illusions, we also ascribe to, or identify our complex semantic states with, different perceptions and evaluate our higher order abstractions as lower.
In hallucinations, this process of reversing the natural order comes to a culminating point: higher order abstractions are translated into, and have the full vividness and 'reality' of, lower order abstractions.