SCIENCE AND SANITY - online book

An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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CONCLUDING REMARKS
551
two and three-valued 'logic'. But once we realize that in a A, oo-valued, more general system, the two-, and three-valued aspects are only particular instances, which apply to some instances but not to others, all our difficulties vanish. From astructural point of view we also understand that oo-valued determinism becomes a necessity of our s.r in the search and comparison of structures.
The result seems to be that the problem of determinism or inde-terminism is not primarily a problem of the outside world, but simply one of our s.r and ignorance versus 'knowledge'. Abandoning elemental-ism and identification, we stop arguing 'is the world deterministic or not'.; but, by analysis, we find which semantics better fit, structurally, the facts and our abstracting capacities. The results we reach are not entirely new, but the semantic conflict is eliminated.
Science employs determinism because of the structure and function of our nervous system. We cannot do otherwise than preserve oo-valued determinism and step by step supply the missing links in our structural adjustments of language to the structure of empirical data.
Let us again repeat that the older problems of 'determinism' in general were the results of elementalism and identification and of a complete misunderstanding of the role of structure. Once these undesirable afflictions are eliminated, the artificial problems which they create are also eliminated. Structural considerations show clearly that determinism is a neurological necessity. If empirical facts lead to linguistic indeterminism, it is an unmistakable sign that the language used is not similar in structure to the structure of the world around us, and that we should simply produce a language of different structure. Such determinism is a vital condition in the search for structure, and cannot be abandoned.
Shall we, then, preserve the deterministic attitude in our 'mental' processes? Are the objections on 'moral' and 'ethical' grounds serious enough to induce us to reinstate in our semantic attitudes the older structurally misleading 'indeterminism'?
Let us, first, recall the facts. In our old el and infantile attitudes with identification we analysed a child or an adult in isolation. Determinism was applied to such a fictitious non-existent individual, and the old objectified and el speculations followed. If any one is inclined to challenge the above statement, let him perform an experiment and immediately after birth isolate a child 'completely'. He will find that this cannot be done with a human baby without destroying the child. Therefore, the old speculations deal with structurally fictitious conditions. The facts are that a baby is, from the first, subjected to a treatment based