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An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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Later the scientist describes his experiments in words. Obviously there are two entirely different stages in building physics, which usually we do not distinguish.
Quite obviously the unspeakable level cannot be called 'physics', and so we must apply the term to the higher order abstractions on the verbal level; namely, to the reasoned verbal account of what the experimenter saw, or felt, or experienced, in general abstracted on the lower levels; summarized, generalized . , in higher orders.
Physics represents then a verbal discipline. Being verbal, it needs a language. What language shall we select? As we want to have a science called physics, we shall naturally try to use the most structurally correct language in existence, so by necessity we must look in the direction of mathematics.
In mathematics we find originally two entirely different disciplines. One we may call arithmetic; the other, geometry. Becoming acquainted with these two originally separated languages, we find that the actual experiments and the stimuli for many experiences of importance to us, are outside our skins; so we try to choose the one of these two languages which is the more closely related in structure to the lower abstractionsthat is, to what we see, feel,. Naturally we have an inclination toward the geometrical languages, dealing with 'lines', 'surfaces', 'volumes'., terms for which we find immediate and quite obvious applications. By further investigation we find that of late both languages have become so developed in structure, that either can be translated perfectly into the other. This fact makes geometry the link between the higher order abstractions and the lower order abstractions. We have seen that physics, as well as geometry, must be considered verbal disciplines and their fusion becomes a very natural fact.
It is true that, as yet, 'time' appears as the bothersome factor, but 'time' may very well be represented geometrically, except that our diagrams and figures look a little different. For instance, aflat circular orbit in two-dimensional 'space' becomes a helix in three-dimensional space-time, a vibrational motion in one-dimensional 'space' becomes a wave-line in two-dimensional space-time , . 'Time', when properly represented, becomes simply another geometrical dimension.
It should not be forgotten that mathematicians obtain most of their structural inspirations from physics and build up mathematical theories to supply the structural needs of the physicist. We see an excellent example of this in the geometries. In the days of Euclid, when physics hardly existed, we had 'emptiness', 'action at a distance', and such notions as were quite satisfactory for the needs of surveyors and builders. With the development of astronomy and physics, curved lines became more and more structurally important, and the haziness of the definition of 'straight line' also became apparent. The notion of 'emptiness* also became slowly structurally untenable. Such geometers as Gauss, Lobatchevski, and others, began to demand that the axioms of geometry be tested by experiment. With the introduction of 'curvature', the 'straight line' became only a special case of a curve with zero curvature.