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An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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696               X. ON THE STRUCTURE OF 'MATTER'
served. Something similar could be said about all theories which postulate too much of a definite mechanism, usually involving some identification somewhere.
The slightest discrepancy between such a theory and observation eliminates the theory as structurally unsatisfactory; while theories which succeed in not postulating mechanisms, and so are formulated in a functional language, last much better. One of the enormous advantages of the Maxwell electromagnetic theory is the fact that it describes the behaviour of electricity and magnetism while hardly positing any mechanism at all. A similar statement applies also to the Einstein theory.
The above general remarks are extremely well illustrated by the newer quantum mechanics.
The classical theories, as usual with scientific theories, were very satisfactory in many respects, but not in all; which is an unattainable ideal always demanded from a good scientific theory. They also postulated too much of a definite mechanism, which was the result of, and led to, the semantic disturbance called identification. Indeed, I have read an address by a prominent physicist in which he claims to have 'seen', and invites everybody else to 'see', an 'electron'. He challenges his critics, and seems to feel like fighting - a quite usual result of identification. Electrons represent inferential entities, and as such cannot be 'seen', but only inferred, which does not detract at all from the importance of the 'electrons'. The 'seeing' business was good enough in the infancy of science, but not in 1933. We 'see' the stick broken in water, the camera records it as broken, and yet it is not broken. We 'see' the fan as a disk, the camera-records it so, but there is no disk. We 'see' a 'solid' piece of wood or stone, which under the microscope proves to have a very different structure , .
In the older days the electrodynamics of moving bodies presented difficulties quite similar to the difficulties encountered in the quantum mechanics. Einstein by an epoch-making stroke of genius solved the problem by observing that, in the languages in question, we operated with a notion of 'simultaneity' which did not correspond to any observable structural phenomenon in the physical world. He discovered that it is impossible to establish the simultaneity of two events occurring at different places, and that a thorough revision of our old theories is necessary in this connection. Einstein formulated a procedure, a method for measurements, taking into account the known laws of the propagation of light and electromagnetic phenomena. He once more established the most important semantic thesis that the laws of nature are relations which are discovered between events which are actually observed, or which are fundamentally observable.
It appears that in the older quantum mechanics there were introduced some objectified entities which were never observed, as, for instance, the positions, velocities, and periods of 'electrons' inside the atom. How indeed could we find lengths and 'times' inside the atom? Such a procedure requires the introduction of rods and clocks, which themselves consist of atoms; so that inside the atom such a procedure cannot be applied. We see clearly that all such conclusions are of an indirect character; but of course such conclusions should