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An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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744
SUPPLEMENT II
taken simply as a class, without logical embarrassment. Yet a class of classes differs from a class, and must therefore be capable of a different characterisation, and thus also be an argument to a function of a different type. With some classes, it may not be possible to consider them as arguments to their own functions, without uncovering a contradiction. In such cases (e.g. the class of those classes which are not members of themselves, and the relations which are connected by their contradictories), it is the difference between the function and the argument that is of moment. That some functions cannot take themselves as arguments does not indicate that all functions are restricted in scope, but simply that they are non-restricted. Some classes and functions are restricted and some are not. To say that all are restricted because some are is an obvious fallacy.
Whenever, as individual, a general proposition is in the class of those objects of which it treats, but cannot be considered as an argument to itself, it is either false or restricted in scope. If the second, its range of arguments must be specified. Accordingly, we can state as a necessary condition for the truth of a general proposition, whose scope is unspecified, that when it has a character, which is one of the characters about which it speaks, it must be an argument to itself. Thus if Bergson adequately described the comic, his formula should be an object of laughter, and if the theory of types is universal in application, it should be capable of being subject to itself. Conformity to this condition indicates that the unrestricted proposition is possibly true; not that it is necessarily true. To demonstrate that such a proposition was necessarily true, it would be essential to show that the supposition of its falsity assumes its truth. That there is danger in applying this rule can be seen from the consideration of some such proposition as: "Everything is made up of language elements". Its denial will be made up of language elements, and would seem to demonstrate that the proposition was necessarily true. Supposition of the falsity of a proposition, however, means verbal denial only in so far as the proposition applies to the realm of language. If it applies to everything, supposition of its falsity involves the positing of the objects of assertions; not the assertions. A necessary unrestricted proposition about everything can be supported only by a demonstration that the supposition of an argument for which it does not hold is self-contradictory. If the proposition has to do with grammar, meaning, logic, judgment, etc., the conditions for a necessarily true and unrestricted proposition would be: 1. the assertion of it is an argument to it; 2. any possible denial is an argument to it. That "any possible denial" rather than "any given denial" is required, is apparent from the consideration of the following propositions: "All sentences are made up of eight words," "No sentence is made up of eight words". Each of these contains eight words. It is because of the fact that we can formulate propositions such as, "It is false that every proposition must be made up of eight words," that the condition is seen not to have been met.
An unrestricted proposition applies to every member of the category, and has some aspect of itself as value. It is in some sense then a determinate in the category which it determines. If the proposition refers to some other category