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An Introduction To Non-aristotelian Systems And General Semantics.

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This list of suggestions is not exhaustive, and in principle appears as inexhaustible. I selected only a few topics of immediate need.
We should also notice that because on objective levels we deal structurally with absolutely individual stages of processes and situations and by necessity we speak in higher order abstractions and generalities and use many multi-ordinal terms (without the use of which no speaking is possible), so any positive statement about the objective levels must be only probable in different degrees, which introduces a fundamental and entirely generalprinciple of uncertainty. Heisenberg's restricted principle in physics appears only as a special case. For structural reasons we must preserve determinism but because of (11-15) the older two-valued determinism must be reformulated into the oo-valued determinism of the maximum probability. The einsteinian introduction of non-elementalism in physics has resulted in the automatic elimination of some semantic blockages in the younger physicists. Some of the semantic results and triumphs of science, besides the new quantum mechanics, can be found in the latest (free from identification of the term 'time' with some objectivity) new entropy of Tolman.3
To sum up, we find that although the primitive man or the 'mentally' ill may have some reactions of orientation, or capacity for relating, which we have in common with the higher animals, yet these do not involve 'reasoning' in the sense defined before. Thus a boxer, football player. , does a great deal of reflexive relating and wins his match, but this cannot be considered as reasoning in the strict sense as used in a-system. If we attempt to discuss something with a primitive or 'mentally' ill individual and write down his processes of relating, we would have to conclude that he uses one-valued semantics of identification of many values into one, or a semantics of inclusion by which 'everything is everything else'. The 'law of contradiction', or any 'excluded' 'third', or '«-th', practically never appears in our sense, yet it is complicated by the use of positive and negative terms, to which any meanings connected with some identifications of higher orders may be ascribed. Although his prevailing semantic processes appear as a complete and literal identification, yet because of the general orienting and relating capacities of organisms and the character of terms used, it would not be easy or profitable to attempt an el formulation of his 'laws of thought'. But a semantic formulation, as given above, is very instructive and comparatively simple.
Our existing el 'logic', besides the two-valued type of formulation, involves many different 'philosophical' elucidations, which instead of clarifying the status of 'logic', in general, tends only to conceal the important issues involved in non-elementalism. The role that identification plays in a given individual appears always as a deciding factor in his adjustment. Unfortunately, at present, the sinister identification is not counteracted but fostered or even induced by the structure of the languages we use, different mythologies . , and our whole educational, economic, social . , systems.
The two-valued A> el, three-dimensional 'logic' does not apply to the world of events, to the objective levels . , and, for the reasons already explained,