266 PSYCHOTHERAPY : SCIENTIFIC AND RELIGIOUS chap.
Now both Jesus and Paul have taught that this emerged personality, though of the same identity, is of a finer type. The doctrine of carnal resurrection based partly on apocalyptic writings similar to Ezekiel's vision of the valley of dried bones is no longer tenable.
A similar view, it seems, prevailed in Egyptian religion. The much-debated term of ' ka } meant a ' double ', coming into being at the time of a person's birth, but existing in the spirit-world. It is possible that this existence meant merely consciousness of a spiritual world. This ' ka y even came to mean a demon or protective genius. So it was the ' ka y that enjoyed the blissful after-life. The deduction of bodily resurrection from the practice of embalming interprets, probably, only a belief held at a certain period.
Based on his belief that the mind is not dependent on the brain which exists primarily to mask the past and to allow only what is practically useful for average thought to make, Bergson l6 (p. 57) concludes his views thus : ' Mental life cannot be an effect of bodily life, that it looks much more as if the body were simply made use of by the mind, and that we have, therefore, no reason to suppose the body and the mind united inseparably to one another. . . . Immortality cannot indeed be proved experimentally, for experience can only be experience of a limited duration ; and when religion speaks of immortality, it appeals to revelation. . . . But if . . . the mental life overflows the cerebral life, if the brain does but translate into movements a small part of what takes place in consciousness, then survival will become so probable that the onus of proof falls on him who doubts it rather than on him who affirms it; for the only reason we can have for believing in the existence of consciousness at death is that we see the body become disintegrated, and that is a fact of experi-